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Abstract
We identify a trade-off between robustness and accuracy that serves as a guiding principle in the design
of defenses against adversarial examples. Although this problem has been widely studied empirically,
much remains unknown concerning the theory underlying this trade-off. In this work, we decompose
the prediction error for adversarial examples (robust error) as the sum of the natural (classification) error
and boundary error, and provide a differentiable upper bound using the theory of classification-calibrated
loss, which is shown to be the tightest possible upper bound uniform over all probability distributions and
measurable predictors. Inspired by our theoretical analysis, we also design a new defense method, TRADES,
to trade adversarial robustness off against accuracy. Our proposed algorithm performs well experimentally in
real-world datasets. The methodology is the foundation of our entry to the NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision
Challenge in which we won the 1st place out of ~2,000 submissions, surpassing the runner-up approach by
11.41% in terms of mean `2 perturbation distance.
1 Introduction
In response to the vulnerability of deep neural networks to small perturbations around input data [SZS+13],
adversarial defenses have been an imperative object of study in machine learning [HPG+17], computer
vision [SKN+18, XWZ+17, MC17], natural language processing [JL17], and many other domains. In machine
learning, study of adversarial defenses has led to significant advances in understanding and defending against
adversarial threat [HWC+17]. In computer vision and natural language processing, adversarial defenses
serve as indispensable building blocks for a range of security-critical systems and applications, such as
autonomous cars and speech recognition authorization. The problem of adversarial defenses can be stated as
that of learning a classifier with high test accuracy on both natural and adversarial examples. The adversarial
example for a given labeled data (x, y) is a data point x′ that causes a classifier c to output a different label
on x′ than y, but is “imperceptibly similar” to x. Given the difficulty of providing an operational definition
of “imperceptible similarity,” adversarial examples typically come in the form of restricted attacks such as
-bounded perturbations [SZS+13], or unrestricted attacks such as adversarial rotations, translations, and
deformations [BCZ+18, ETT+17, GAG+18, XZL+18, AAG19, ZCS+19]. The focus of this work is the
former setting, though our framework can be generalized to the latter.
Despite a large literature devoted to improving the robustness of deep-learning models, many fundamental
questions remain unresolved. One of the most important questions is how to trade off adversarial robustness
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	Figure 1: Left figure: decision boundary learned by natural training method. Right figure: decision boundary
learned by our adversarial training method, where the orange dotted line represents the decision boundary in
the left figure. It shows that both methods achieve zero natural training error, while our adversarial training
method achieves better robust training error than the natural training method.
against natural accuracy. Statistically, robustness can be be at odds with accuracy [TSE+19]. This has led to an
empirical line of work on adversarial defense that incorporates various kinds of assumptions [SZC+18, KGB17].
On the theoretical front, methods such as relaxation based defenses [KW18, RSL18a] provide provable
guarantees for adversarial robustness. They, however, ignore the performance of classifier on the non-adversarial
examples, and thus leave open the theoretical treatment of the putative robustness/accuracy trade-off.
The problem of adversarial defense becomes more challenging when computational issues are considered.
For example, the straightforward empirical risk minimization (ERM) formulation of robust classification
involves minimizing the robust 0-1 loss maxx′:‖x′−x‖≤ 1{c(x′) 6= y}, a loss which is NP-hard to optimize
even if  = 0 in general. Hence, it is natural to expect that some prior work on adversarial defense replaced
the 0-1 loss 1(·) with a surrogate loss [MMS+18, KGB17, UOKvdO18]. However, there is little theoretical
guarantee on the tightness of this approximation.
1.1 Our methodology and results
We begin with an example that illustrates the trade-off between accuracy and adversarial robustness in Sec-
tion 2.4. This phenomenon was first theoretically demonstrated by [TSE+19]. We construct another toy
example where the Bayes optimal classifier achieves natural error 0% and robust error 100%, while the trivial
all-one classifier achieves both natural error and robust error 50% (Table 1). While a large literature on the
analysis of robust error in terms of generalization [SST+18, CBM18, YRB18] and computational complex-
ity [BPR18, BLPR18], in this work we focus on how to address the trade-off between the natural error and the
robust error.
We show that the robust error can in general be bounded tightly using two terms: one corresponds to the
natural error measured by a surrogate loss function, and the other corresponds to how likely the input features
are close to the -extension of the decision boundary, termed as the boundary error. We then minimize the
differentiable upper bound. Our theoretical analysis naturally leads to a new formulation of adversarial defense
which has several appealing properties; in particular, it inherits the benefits of scalability to large datasets
exhibited by Tiny ImageNet, and the algorithm achieves state-of-the-art performance on a range of benchmarks
while providing theoretical guarantees. For example, while the defenses overviewed in [ACW18] achieve
robust accuracy no higher than ~47% under white-box attacks, our method achieves robust accuracy as high as
~57% in the same setting. The methodology is the foundation of our entry to the NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial
Vision Challenge where we won first place out of ~2,000 submissions, surpassing the runner-up approach by
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11.41% in terms of mean `2 perturbation distance.
1.2 Summary of contributions
Our work tackles the problem of trading accuracy off against robustness and advances the state-of-the-art in
multiple ways.
• Theoretically, we characterize the trade-off between accuracy and robustness for classification problems
via decomposing the robust error as the sum of the natural error and the boundary error. We provide
differentiable upper bounds on both terms using the theory of classification-calibrated loss, which
are shown to be the tightest upper bounds uniform over all probability distributions and measurable
predictors.
• Algorithmically, inspired by our theoretical analysis, we propose a new formulation of adversarial
defense, TRADES, as optimizing a regularized surrogate loss. The loss consists of two terms: the term
of empirical risk minimization encourages the algorithm to maximize the natural accuracy, while the
regularization term encourages the algorithm to push the decision boundary away from the data, so as to
improve adversarial robustness (see Figure 1).
• Experimentally, we show that our proposed algorithm outperforms state-of-the-art methods under both
black-box and white-box threat models. In particular, the methodology won the final round of the
NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge.
2 Preliminaries
We illustrate our methodology using the framework of binary classification, but it can be generalized to other
settings as well.
2.1 Notations
We will use bold capital letters such as X and Y to represent random vector, bold lower-case letters such as x
and y to represent realization of random vector, capital letters such as X and Y to represent random variable,
and lower-case letters such as x and y to represent realization of random variable. Specifically, we denote
by x ∈ X the sample instance, and by y ∈ {−1,+1} the label, where X ⊆ Rd indicates the instance space.
sign(x) represents the sign of scalar x with sign(0) = +1. Denote by f : X → R the score function which
maps an instance to a confidence value associated with being positive. It can be parametrized, e.g., by deep
neural networks. The associated binary classifier is sign(f(·)). We will frequently use 1{event}, the 0-1 loss,
to represent an indicator function that is 1 if an event happens and 0 otherwise. For norms, we denote by ‖x‖ a
generic norm. Examples of norms include ‖x‖∞, the infinity norm of vector x, and ‖x‖2, the `2 norm of vector
x. We use B(x, ) to represent a neighborhood of x: {x′ ∈ X : ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ }. For a given score function f ,
we denote by DB(f) the decision boundary of f ; that is, the set {x ∈ X : f(x) = 0}. The set B(DB(f), )
denotes the neighborhood of the decision boundary of f : {x ∈ X : ∃x′ ∈ B(x, ) s.t. f(x)f(x′) ≤ 0}. For
a given function ψ(u), we denote by ψ∗(v) := supu{uTv − ψ(u)} the conjugate function of ψ, by ψ∗∗ the
bi-conjugate, and by ψ−1 the inverse function. We will frequently use φ(·) to indicate the surrogate of 0-1 loss.
2.2 Robust (classification) error
In the setting of adversarial learning, we are given a set of instances x1, ...,xn ∈ X and labels y1, ..., yn ∈
{−1,+1}. We assume that the data are sampled from an unknown distribution (X, Y ) ∼ D. To characterize
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Figure 2: Counterexample given by Eqn. (2).
the robustness of a score function f : X → R, [SST+18, CBM18, BPR18] defined robust (classification) error
under the threat model of bounded  perturbation: Rrob(f) := E(X,Y )∼D1{∃X ′∈B(X, ) s.t. f(X ′)Y ≤ 0}.
This is in sharp contrast to the standard measure of classifier performance—the natural (classification) error
Rnat(f) := E(X,Y )∼D1{f(X)Y ≤ 0}. We note that the two errors satisfyRrob(f) ≥ Rnat(f) for all f ; the
robust error is equal to the natural error when  = 0.
2.3 Boundary error
We introduce the boundary error defined as Rbdy(f) := E(X,Y )∼D1{X ∈ B(DB(f), ), f(X)Y > 0}. We
have the following decomposition ofRrob(f):
Rrob(f) = Rnat(f) +Rbdy(f). (1)
2.4 Trade-off between natural and robust errors
Our study is motivated by the trade-off between natural and robust errors. [TSE+19] theoretically showed that
training models to be robust may lead to a reduction of standard accuracy by constructing a toy example. To
illustrate the phenomenon, we provide another toy example here.
Example. Consider the case (X,Y ) ∼ D, where the marginal distribution over the instance space is a uniform
distribution over [0, 1], and for k = 0, 1, ..., d 12 − 1e,
η(x) := Pr(Y = 1|X = x)
=
{
0, x ∈ [2k, (2k + 1)),
1, x ∈ ((2k + 1), (2k + 2)].
(2)
See Figure 2 for the visualization of η(x). We consider two classifiers: a) the Bayes optimal classifier
sign(2η(x) − 1); b) the all-one classifier which always outputs “positive.” Table 1 displays the trade-off
between natural and robust errors: the minimal natural error is achieved by the Bayes optimal classifier with
large robust error, while the optimal robust error is achieved by the all-one classifier with large natural error.
Our goal. In practice, one may prefer to trade-off between robustness and accuracy by introducing weights
in (1) to bias more towards the natural error or the boundary error. Noting that both the natural error and the
boundary error involve 0-1 loss functions, our goal is to devise tight differentiable upper bounds on both of
these terms. Towards this goal, we utilize the theory of classification-calibrated loss.
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Table 1: Comparisons of natural and robust errors of Bayes optimal classifier and all-one classifier in example
(2). The Bayes optimal classifier has the optimal natural error while the all-one classifier has the optimal robust
error.
Bayes Optimal Classifier All-One Classifier
Rnat 0 (optimal) 1/2
Rbdy 1 0
Rrob 1 1/2 (optimal)
Table 2: Examples of classification-calibrated loss φ and associated ψ-transform. Here ψlog(θ) = 12(1 −
θ) log2(1− θ) + 12(1 + θ) log2(1 + θ).
Loss φ(α) ψ(θ)
Hinge max{1− α, 0} θ
Sigmoid 1− tanh(α) θ
Exponential exp(−α) 1−√1− θ2
Logistic log2(1 + exp(−α)) ψlog(θ)
2.5 Classification-calibrated surrogate loss
Definition. Minimization of the 0-1 loss in the natural and robust errors is computationally intractable
and the demands of computational efficiency have led researchers to focus on minimization of a tractable
surrogate loss,Rφ(f) := E(X,Y )∼Dφ(f(X)Y ). We then need to find quantitative relationships between the
excess errors associated with φ and those associated with 0–1 loss. We make a weak assumption on φ: it is
classification-calibrated [BJM06]. Formally, for η ∈ [0, 1], define the conditional φ-risk by
H(η) := inf
α∈R
Cη(α) := inf
α∈R
(ηφ(α) + (1− η)φ(−α)) ,
and define H−(η) := infα(2η−1)≤0Cη(α). The classification-calibrated condition requires that imposing the
constraint that α has an inconsistent sign with the Bayes decision rule sign(2η − 1) leads to a strictly larger
φ-risk:
Assumption 1 (Classification-Calibrated Loss). We assume that the surrogate loss φ is classification-calibrated,
meaning that for any η 6= 1/2, H−(η) > H(η).
We argue that Assumption 1 is indispensable for classification problems, since without it the Bayes optimal
classifier cannot be the minimizer of the φ-risk. Examples of classification-calibrated loss include hinge loss,
sigmoid loss, exponential loss, logistic loss, and many others (see Table 2).
Properties. Classification-calibrated loss has many structural properties that one can exploit. We begin by
introducing a functional transform of classification-calibrated loss φ which was proposed by [BJM06]. Define
the function ψ : [0, 1]→ [0,∞) by ψ = ψ˜∗∗, where ψ˜(θ) := H− (1+θ2 )−H (1+θ2 ). Indeed, the function ψ(θ)
is the largest convex lower bound on H−
(
1+θ
2
)−H (1+θ2 ). The value H− (1+θ2 )−H (1+θ2 ) characterizes
how close the surrogate loss φ is to the class of non-classification-calibrated losses.
Below we state useful properties of the ψ-transform. We will frequently use the function ψ to bound
Rrob(f)−R∗nat.
Lemma 2.1 ([BJM06]). Under Assumption 1, the function ψ has the following properties: ψ is non-decreasing,
continuous, convex on [0, 1] and ψ(0) = 0.
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3 Relating 0-1 loss to Surrogate Loss
In this section, we present our main theoretical contributions for binary classification and compare our results
with prior literature. Binary classification problems have received significant attention in recent years as many
competitions evaluate the performance of robust models on binary classification problems [BCZ+18]. We defer
the discussion of multi-class problems to Section 4.
3.1 Upper bound
Our analysis leads to a guarantee on the performance of surrogate loss minimization. Intuitively, by Eqn. (1),
Rrob(f) −R∗nat = Rnat(f) −R∗nat +Rbdy(f) ≤ ψ−1(Rφ(f) −R∗φ) +Rbdy(f), where the last inequality
holds because we choose φ as a classification-calibrated loss [BJM06]. This leads to the following result.
Theorem 3.1. Let Rφ(f) := Eφ(f(X)Y ) and R∗φ := minf Rφ(f). Under Assumption 1, for any non-
negative loss function φ such that φ(0) ≥ 1, any measurable f : X → R, any probability distribution on
X × {±1}, and any λ > 0, we have1
Rrob(f)−R∗nat ≤ ψ−1(Rφ(f)−R∗φ)+Pr[X∈B(DB(f), ), f(X)Y > 0]
≤ ψ−1(Rφ(f)−R∗φ) + E max
X′∈B(X,)
φ(f(X ′)f(X)/λ).
Quantity governing model robustness. Our result provides a formal justification for the existence of adver-
sarial examples: learning models are vulnerable to small adversarial attacks because the probability that data
lie around the decision boundary of the model, Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f), ), f(X)Y > 0], is large. As a result, small
perturbations may move the data point to the wrong side of the decision boundary, leading to weak robustness
of classification models.
3.2 Lower bound
We now establish a lower bound onRrob(f)−R∗nat. Our lower bound matches our analysis of the upper bound
in Section 3.1 up to an arbitrarily small constant.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that |X | ≥ 2. Under Assumption 1, for any non-negative loss function φ such that
φ(x)→ 0 as x→ +∞, any ξ > 0, and any θ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a probability distribution on X × {±1}, a
function f : Rd → R, and a regularization parameter λ > 0 such thatRrob(f)−R∗nat = θ and
ψ
(
θ − E max
X′∈B(X,)
φ(f(X ′)f(X)/λ)
)
≤ Rφ(f)−R∗φ ≤ ψ
(
θ − E max
X′∈B(X,)
φ(f(X ′)f(X)/λ)
)
+ ξ.
Theorem 3.2 demonstrates that in the presence of extra conditions on the loss function, i.e., limx→+∞ φ(x) =
0, the upper bound in Section 3.1 is tight. The condition holds for all the losses in Table 2.
4 Algorithmic Design for Defenses
Optimization. Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 shed light on algorithmic designs of adversarial defenses. In order to
minimizeRrob(f)−R∗nat, the theorems suggest minimizing2
min
f
E
{
φ(f(X)Y )︸ ︷︷ ︸
for accuracy
+ max
X′∈B(X,)
φ(f(X)f(X ′)/λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
regularization for robustness
}
. (3)
1We study the population form of the risk functions, and mention that by incorporating the generalization theory for classification-
calibrated losses [BJM06] one can extend the analysis to finite samples. We leave this analysis for future research.
2For simplicity of implementation, we do not use the function ψ−1 and rely on λ to approximately reflect the effect of ψ−1, the
trade-off between the natural error and the boundary error, and the tight approximation of the boundary error using the corresponding
surrogate loss function.
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We name our method TRADES (TRadeoff-inspired Adversarial DEfense via Surrogate-loss minimization).
Intuition behind the optimization. Problem (3) captures the trade-off between the natural and robust errors:
the first term in (3) encourages the natural error to be optimized by minimizing the “difference” between f(X)
and Y , while the second regularization term encourages the output to be smooth, that is, it pushes the decision
boundary of classifier away from the sample instances via minimizing the “difference” between the prediction
of natural example f(X) and that of adversarial example f(X ′). This is conceptually consistent with the
argument that smoothness is an indispensable property of robust models [CBG+17]. The tuning parameter
λ plays a critical role on balancing the importance of natural and robust errors. To see how the λ affects the
solution in the example of Section 2.4, problem (3) tends to the Bayes optimal classifier when λ→ +∞, and
tends to the all-one classifier when λ→ 0.
Comparisons with prior work. We compare our approach with several related lines of research in the prior
literature. One of the best known algorithms for adversarial defense is based on robust optimization [MMS+18,
KW18, WSMK18, RSL18a, RSL18b]. Most results in this direction involve algorithms that approximately
minimize
min
f
E
{
max
X′∈B(X,)
φ(f(X ′)Y )
}
, (4)
where the objective function in problem (4) serves as an upper bound of the robust errorRrob(f). In complex
problem domains, however, this objective function might not be tight as an upper bound of the robust error, and
may not capture the trade-off between natural and robust errors.
A related line of research is adversarial training by regularization [MMIK18, KGB17, RDV17, ZSLG16].
There are several key differences between the results in this paper and those of [KGB17, RDV17, ZSLG16].
Firstly, the optimization formulations are different. In the previous works, the regularization term either mea-
sures the “difference” between f(X ′) and Y [KGB17], or its gradient [RDV17]. In contrast, our regularization
term measures the “difference” between f(X) and f(X ′). While [ZSLG16] generated the adversarial example
X ′ by adding random Gaussian noise to X , our method simulates the adversarial example by solving the inner
maximization problem in Eqn. (3). Secondly, we note that the losses in [MMIK18, KGB17, RDV17, ZSLG16]
lack of theoretical guarantees. Our loss, with the presence of the second term in problem (3), makes our
theoretical analysis significantly more subtle. Moreover, our algorithm takes the same computational resources
as [KGB17], which makes our method scalable to large-scale datasets. We defer the experimental comparisons
of various regularization based methods to Table 5.
Differences with Adversarial Logit Pairing. We also compare TRADES with Adversarial Logit Pairing
(ALP) [KKG18, EIA18]. The algorithm of ALP works as follows: given a fixed network f in each round, the
algorithm firstly generates an adversarial example X ′ by solving argmaxX′∈B(X,) φ(f(X ′)Y ); ALP then
updates the network parameter by solving a minimization problem
min
f
E
{
αφ(f(X ′)Y ) + (1− α)φ(f(X)Y ) + ‖f(X)− f(X ′)‖2/λ
}
,
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is a regularization parameter; the algorithm finally repeats the above-mentioned pro-
cedure until it converges. We note that there are fundamental differences between TRADES and ALP.
While ALP simulates adversarial example X ′ by the FGSMk attack, TRADES simulates X ′ by solving
argmaxX′∈B(X,) φ(f(X)f(X ′)/λ). Moreover, while ALP uses the `2 loss between f(X) and f(X ′) to
regularize the training procedure without theoretical guarantees, TRADES uses the classification-calibrated
loss according to Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
Heuristic algorithm. In response to the optimization formulation (3), we use two heuristics to achieve more
general defenses: a) extending to multi-class problems by involving multi-class calibrated loss; b) approximately
solving the minimax problem via alternating gradient descent. For multi-class problems, a surrogate loss
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Algorithm 1 Adversarial training by TRADES
1: Input: Step sizes η1 and η2, batch size m, number of iterations K in inner optimization, network
architecture parametrized by θ
2: Output: Robust network fθ
3: Randomly initialize network fθ, or initialize network with pre-trained configuration
4: repeat
5: Read mini-batch B = {x1, ...,xm} from training set
6: for i = 1, ...,m (in parallel) do
7: x′i ← xi + 0.001 · N (0, I), where N (0, I) is the Gaussian distribution with zero mean and identity
variance
8: for k = 1, ...,K do
9: x′i ← ΠB(xi,)(η1sign(∇x′iL(fθ(xi), fθ(x′i))) + x′i), where Π is the projection operator
10: end for
11: end for
12: θ ← θ − η2
∑m
i=1∇θ[L(fθ(xi),yi) + L(fθ(xi), fθ(x′i))/λ]/m
13: until training converged
is calibrated if minimizers of the surrogate risk are also minimizers of the 0-1 risk [PS16]. Examples of
multi-class calibrated loss include cross-entropy loss. Algorithmically, we extend problem (3) to the case of
multi-class classifications by replacing φ with a multi-class calibrated loss L(·, ·):
min
f
E
{
L(f(X),Y ) + max
X′∈B(X,)
L(f(X), f(X ′))/λ
}
, (5)
where f(X) is the output vector of learning model (with softmax operator in the top layer for the cross-entropy
loss L(·, ·)), Y is the label-indicator vector, and λ > 0 is the regularization parameter. One can also exchange
f(X) and f(X ′) in the second term of (5). The pseudocode of adversarial training procedure, which aims at
minimizing the empirical form of problem (5), is displayed in Algorithm 1.
The key ingredient of the algorithm is to approximately solve the linearization of inner maximization in
problem (5) by the projected gradient descent (see Step 7). We note that xi is a global minimizer with zero
gradient to the objective function g(x′) := L(f(xi), f(x′)) in the inner problem. Therefore, we initialize
x′i by adding a small, random perturbation around xi in Step 5 to start the inner optimizer. More exhaustive
approximations of the inner maximization problem in terms of either optimization formulations or solvers
would lead to better defense performance.
Semi-supervised learning. We note that TRADES problem (5) can be straightforwardly applied to the semi-
supervised learning framework, as the second term in problem (5) does not depend on the label Y . Therefore,
with more unlabeled data points, one can approximate the second term (in the expectation form) better by the
empirical loss minimization. There are many interesting recent works which explore the benefits of invloving
unlabeled data [CRS+19, SFK+19, ZCH+19].
Acceleration. Adversarial training is typically more than 10x slower than natural training. To resolve this issue
for TRADES, [SNG+19, ZZL+19] proposed new algorithms to solve problem (5) at negligible additional cost
compared to natural training.
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we verify the effectiveness of TRADES by numerical experiments. We denote by Arob(f) =
1 − Rrob(f) the robust accuracy, and by Anat(f) = 1 − Rnat(f) the natural accuracy on test dataset. We
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Table 3: Theoretical verification on the optimality of Theorem 3.1.
λ Arob(f) (%) Rφ(f) ∆ = ∆RHS −∆LHS
2.0 99.43 0.0006728 0.006708
3.0 99.41 0.0004067 0.005914
4.0 99.37 0.0003746 0.006757
5.0 99.34 0.0003430 0.005860
release our code and trained models at https://github.com/yaodongyu/TRADES.
5.1 Optimality of Theorem 3.1
We verify the tightness of the established upper bound in Theorem 3.1 for binary classification problem on
MNIST dataset. The negative examples are ‘1’ and the positive examples are ‘3’. Here we use a Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) with two convolutional layers, followed by two fully-connected layers. The output size
of the last layer is 1. To learn the robust classifier, we minimize the regularized surrogate loss in Eqn. (3), and
use the hinge loss in Table 2 as the surrogate loss φ, where the associated ψ-transform is ψ(θ) = θ.
To verify the tightness of our upper bound, we calculate the left hand side in Theorem 3.1, i.e.,
∆LHS = Rrob(f)−R∗nat,
and the right hand side, i.e.,
∆RHS = (Rφ(f)−R∗φ) + E max
X′∈B(X,)
φ(f(X ′)f(X)/λ).
As we cannot have access to the unknown distribution D, we approximate the above expectation terms by test
dataset. We first use natural training method to train a classifier so as to approximately estimate R∗nat and
R∗φ, where we find that the naturally trained classifier can achieve natural error R∗nat = 0%, and loss value
R∗φ = 0.0 for the binary classification problem. Next, we optimize problem (3) to train a robust classifier f .
We take perturbation  = 0.1, number of iterations K = 20 and run 30 epochs on the training dataset. Finally,
to approximate the second term in ∆RHS, we use FGSMk (white-box) attack (a.k.a. PGD attack) [KGB17] with
20 iterations to approximately calculate the worst-case perturbed data X ′.
The results in Table 3 show the tightness of our upper bound in Theorem 3.1. It shows that the differences
between ∆RHS and ∆LHS under various λ’s are very small.
5.2 Sensitivity of regularization hyperparameter λ
The regularization parameter λ is an important hyperparameter in our proposed method. We show how the
regularization parameter affects the performance of our robust classifiers by numerical experiments on two
datasets, MNIST and CIFAR10. For both datasets, we minimize the loss in Eqn. (5) to learn robust classifiers
for multi-class problems, where we choose L as the cross-entropy loss.
MNIST setup. We use the CNN which has two convolutional layers, followed by two fully-connected layers.
The output size of the last layer is 10. We set perturbation  = 0.1, perturbation step size η1 = 0.01, number of
iterations K = 20, learning rate η2 = 0.01, batch size m = 128, and run 50 epochs on the training dataset.
To evaluate the robust error, we apply FGSMk (white-box) attack with 40 iterations and 0.005 step size. The
results are in Table 4.
CIFAR10 setup. We apply ResNet-18 [HZRS16] for classification. The output size of the last layer is 10. We
set perturbation  = 0.031, perturbation step size η1 = 0.007, number of iterations K = 10, learning rate
η2 = 0.1, batch size m = 128, and run 100 epochs on the training dataset. To evaluate the robust error, we
apply FGSMk (white-box) attack with 20 iterations and the step size is 0.003. The results are in Table 4.
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Table 4: Sensitivity of regularization hyperparameter λ on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets.
MNIST CIFAR10
1/λ Arob(f) (%) Anat(f) (%) Arob(f) (%) Anat(f) (%)
0.1 91.09 ± 0.0385 99.41 ± 0.0235 26.53 ± 1.1698 91.31 ± 0.0579
0.2 92.18 ± 0.0450 99.38 ± 0.0094 37.71 ± 0.6743 89.56 ± 0.2154
0.4 93.21 ± 0.0660 99.35 ± 0.0082 41.50 ± 0.3376 87.91 ± 0.2944
0.6 93.87 ± 0.0464 99.33 ± 0.0141 43.37 ± 0.2706 87.50 ± 0.1621
0.8 94.32 ± 0.0492 99.31 ± 0.0205 44.17 ± 0.2834 87.11 ± 0.2123
1.0 94.75 ± 0.0712 99.28 ± 0.0125 44.68 ± 0.3088 87.01 ± 0.2819
2.0 95.45 ± 0.0883 99.29 ± 0.0262 48.22 ± 0.0740 85.22 ± 0.0543
3.0 95.57 ± 0.0262 99.24 ± 0.0216 49.67 ± 0.3179 83.82 ± 0.4050
4.0 95.65 ± 0.0340 99.16 ± 0.0205 50.25 ± 0.1883 82.90 ± 0.2217
5.0 95.65 ± 0.1851 99.16 ± 0.0403 50.64 ± 0.3336 81.72 ± 0.0286
We observe that as the regularization parameter 1/λ increases, the natural accuracy Anat(f) decreases
while the robust accuracy Arob(f) increases, which verifies our theory on the trade-off between robustness and
accuracy. Note that for MNIST dataset, the natural accuracy does not decrease too much as the regularization
term 1/λ increases, which is different from the results of CIFAR10. This is probably because the classification
task for MNIST is easier. Meanwhile, our proposed method is not very sensitive to the choice of λ. Empirically,
when we set the hyperparameter 1/λ in [1, 10], our method is able to learn classifiers with both high robustness
and high accuracy. We will set 1/λ as either 1 or 6 in the following experiments.
5.3 Adversarial defenses under various attacks
Previously, [ACW18] showed that 7 defenses in ICLR 2018 which relied on obfuscated gradients may easily
break down. In this section, we verify the effectiveness of our method with the same experimental setup under
both white-box and black-box threat models.
MNIST setup. We use the CNN architecture in [CW17] with four convolutional layers, followed by three
fully-connected layers. We set perturbation  = 0.3, perturbation step size η1 = 0.01, number of iterations
K = 40, learning rate η2 = 0.01, batch size m = 128, and run 100 epochs on the training dataset.
CIFAR10 setup. We use the same neural network architecture as [MMS+18], i.e., the wide residual network
WRN-34-10 [ZK16]. We set perturbation  = 0.031, perturbation step size η1 = 0.007, number of iterations
K = 10, learning rate η2 = 0.1, batch size m = 128, and run 100 epochs on the training dataset.
5.3.1 White-box attacks
We summarize our results in Table 5 together with the results from [ACW18]. We also implement methods
in [ZSLG16, KGB17, RDV17] on the CIFAR10 dataset as they are also regularization based methods. For
MNIST dataset, we apply FGSMk (white-box) attack with 40 iterations and the step size is 0.01. For CIFAR10
dataset, we apply FGSMk (white-box) attack with 20 iterations and the step size is 0.003, under which the
defense model in [MMS+18] achieves 47.04% robust accuracy. Table 5 shows that our proposed defense
method can significantly improve the robust accuracy of models, which is able to achieve robust accuracy
as high as 56.61%. We also evaluate our robust model on MNIST dataset under the same threat model as
in [SKC18] (C&W white-box attack [CW17]), and the robust accuracy is 99.46%. See appendix for detailed
information of models in Table 5.
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Table 5: Comparisons of TRADES with prior defense models under white-box attacks.
Defense Defense type Under which attack Dataset Distance Anat(f) Arob(f)
[BRRG18] gradient mask [ACW18] CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) - 0%
[MLW+18] gradient mask [ACW18] CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) - 5%
[DAL+18] gradient mask [ACW18] CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) - 0%
[SKN+18] gradient mask [ACW18] CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) - 9%
[NKM17] gradient mask [ACW18] CIFAR10 0.015 (`∞) - 15%
[WSMK18] robust opt. FGSM20 (PGD) CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 27.07% 23.54%
[MMS+18] robust opt. FGSM20 (PGD) CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 87.30% 47.04%
[ZSLG16] regularization FGSM20 (PGD) CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 94.64% 0.15%
[KGB17] regularization FGSM20 (PGD) CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 85.25% 45.89%
[RDV17] regularization FGSM20 (PGD) CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 95.34% 0%
TRADES (1/λ = 1) regularization FGSM1,000 (PGD) CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 88.64% 48.90%
TRADES (1/λ = 6) regularization FGSM1,000 (PGD) CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 84.92% 56.43%
TRADES (1/λ = 1) regularization FGSM20 (PGD) CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 88.64% 49.14%
TRADES (1/λ = 6) regularization FGSM20 (PGD) CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 84.92% 56.61%
TRADES (1/λ = 1) regularization DeepFool (`∞) CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 88.64% 59.10%
TRADES (1/λ = 6) regularization DeepFool (`∞) CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 84.92% 61.38%
TRADES (1/λ = 1) regularization LBFGSAttack CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 88.64% 84.41%
TRADES (1/λ = 6) regularization LBFGSAttack CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 84.92% 81.58%
TRADES (1/λ = 1) regularization MI-FGSM CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 88.64% 51.26%
TRADES (1/λ = 6) regularization MI-FGSM CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 84.92% 57.95%
TRADES (1/λ = 1) regularization C&W CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 88.64% 84.03%
TRADES (1/λ = 6) regularization C&W CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 84.92% 81.24%
[SKC18] gradient mask [ACW18] MNIST 0.005 (`2) - 55%
[MMS+18] robust opt. FGSM40 (PGD) MNIST 0.3 (`∞) 99.36% 96.01%
TRADES (1/λ = 6) regularization FGSM1,000 (PGD) MNIST 0.3 (`∞) 99.48% 95.60%
TRADES (1/λ = 6) regularization FGSM40 (PGD) MNIST 0.3 (`∞) 99.48% 96.07%
TRADES (1/λ = 6) regularization C&W MNIST 0.005 (`2) 99.48% 99.46%
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Table 6: Comparisons of TRADES with prior defenses under black-box FGSM40 attack on the MNIST dataset.
The models inside parentheses are source models which provide gradients to adversarial attackers. We provide
the average cross-entropy loss value L(f(X),Y ) of each defense model in the bracket. The defense model
‘Madry’ is the same model as in the antepenultimate line of Table 5. The defense model ‘TRADES’ is the same
model as in the penultimate line of Table 5.
Defense Model Robust Accuracy Arob(f)
Madry 97.43% [0.0078484] (Natural)
TRADES 97.63% [0.0075324] (Natural)
Madry 97.38% [0.0084962] (Ours)
TRADES 97.66% [0.0073532] (Madry)
Table 7: Comparisons of TRADES with prior defenses under black-box FGSM20 attack on the CIFAR10
dataset. The models inside parentheses are source models which provide gradients to adversarial attackers. We
provide the average cross-entropy loss value of each defense model in the bracket. The defense model ‘Madry’
is implemented based on [MMS+18], and the defense model ‘TRADES’ is the same model as in the 11th line
of Table 5.
Defense Model Robust Accuracy Arob(f)
Madry 84.39% [0.0519784] (Natural)
TRADES 87.60% [0.0380258] (Natural)
Madry 66.00% [0.1252672] (Ours)
TRADES 70.14% [0.0885364] (Madry)
5.3.2 Black-box attacks
We verify the robustness of our models under black-box attacks. We first train models without using adversarial
training on the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. We use the same network architectures that are specified in the
beginning of this section, i.e., the CNN architecture in [CW17] and the WRN-34-10 architecture in [ZK16]. We
denote these models by naturally trained models (Natural). The accuracy of the naturally trained CNN model
is 99.50% on the MNIST dataset. The accuracy of the naturally trained WRN-34-10 model is 95.29% on the
CIFAR10 dataset. We also implement the method proposed in [MMS+18] on both datasets. We denote these
models by Madry’s models (Madry). The accuracy of [MMS+18]’s CNN model is 99.36% on the MNIST
dataset. The accuracy of [MMS+18]’s WRN-34-10 model is 85.49% on the CIFAR10 dataset.
For both datasets, we use FGSMk (black-box) method to attack various defense models. For MNIST
dataset, we set perturbation  = 0.3 and apply FGSMk (black-box) attack with 40 iterations and the step size is
0.01. For CIFAR10 dataset, we set  = 0.031 and apply FGSMk (black-box) attack with 20 iterations and the
step size is 0.003. Note that the setup is the same as the setup specified in Section 5.3.1. We summarize our
results in Table 6 and Table 7. In both tables, we use two source models (noted in the parentheses) to generate
adversarial perturbations: we compute the perturbation directions according to the gradients of the source
models on the input images. It shows that our models are more robust against black-box attacks transfered from
naturally trained models and [MMS+18]’s models. Moreover, our models can generate stronger adversarial
examples for black-box attacks compared with naturally trained models and [MMS+18]’s models.
5.4 Case study: NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge
Competition settings. In the adversarial competition, the adversarial attacks and defenses are under the
black-box setting. The dataset in this competition is Tiny ImageNet, which consists of 550,000 data (with
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Figure 3: Top-6 results (out of ~2,000 submissions) in the NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge. The
vertical axis represents the mean `2 perturbation distance that makes robust models fail to output correct labels.
our data augmentation) and 200 classes. The robust models only return label predictions instead of explicit
gradients and confidence scores. The task for robust models is to defend against adversarial examples that
are generated by the top-5 submissions in the un-targeted attack track. The score for each defense model is
evaluated by the smallest perturbation distance that makes the defense model fail to output correct labels.
Competition results. The methodology in this paper was applied to the competition, where our entry ranked
the 1st place. We implemented our method to train ResNet models. We report the mean `2 perturbation distance
of the top-6 entries in Figure 3. It shows that our method outperforms other approaches with a large margin. In
particular, we surpass the runner-up submission by 11.41% in terms of mean `2 perturbation distance.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the problem of adversarial defenses against structural perturbations around input data.
We focus on the trade-off between robustness and accuracy, and show an upper bound on the gap between
robust error and optimal natural error. Our result advances the state-of-the-art work and matches the lower
bound in the worst-case scenario. The bounds motivate us to minimize a new form of regularized surrogate loss,
TRADES, for adversarial training. Experiments on real datasets and adversarial competition demonstrate the
effectiveness of our proposed algorithms. It would be interesting to combine our methods with other related line
of research on adversarial defenses, e.g., feature denoising technique [XWvdM+18] and network architecture
design [CBG+17], to achieve more robust learning systems.
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A Other Related Works
Attack methods. Although deep neural networks have achieved great progress in various areas [ZSS19,
ZXJ+18], they are brittle to adversarial attacks. Adversarial attacks have been extensively studied in the recent
years. One of the baseline attacks to deep nerual networks is the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [GSS15].
FGSM computes an adversarial example as
x′ := x+ sign(∇xφ(f(x)y)),
where x is the input instance, y is the label, f : X → R is the score function (parametrized by deep nerual
network for example) which maps an instance to its confidence value of being positive, and φ(·) is a surrogate
of 0-1 loss. A more powerful yet natural extension of FGSM is the multi-step variant FGSMk (also known as
PGD attack) [KGB17]. FGSMk applies projected gradient descent by k times:
x′t+1 := ΠB(x,)(x
′
t + sign(∇xφ(f(x′t)y))),
where x′t is the t-th iteration of the algorithm with x′0 := x and ΠB(x,) is the projection operator onto the
ball B(x, ). Both FGSM and FGSMk are approximately solving (the linear approximation of) maximization
problem:
max
x′∈B(x,)
φ(f(x′)y).
They can be adapted to the purpose of black-box attacks by running the algorithms on another similar network
which is white-box to the algorithms [TKP+18]. Though defenses that cause obfuscated gradients defeat
iterative optimization based attacks, [ACW18] showed that defenses relying on this effect can be circumvented.
Other attack methods include MI-FGSM [DLP+18] and LBFGS attacks [TV16].
Robust optimization based defenses. Compared with attack methods, adversarial defense methods are
relatively fewer. Robust optimization based defenses are inspired by the above-mentioned attacks. Intuitively,
the methods train a network by fitting its parameters to the adversarial examples:
min
f
E
{
max
X′∈B(X,)
φ(f(X ′)Y )
}
. (6)
Following this framework, [HXSS15, SYN15] considered one-step adversaries, while [MMS+18] worked with
multi-step methods for the inner maximization problem. There are, however, two critical differences between
the robust optimization based defenses and the present paper. Firstly, robust optimization based defenses lack of
theoretical guarantees. Secondly, such methods do not consider the trade-off between accuracy and robustness.
Relaxation based defenses. We mention another related line of research in adversarial defenses—relaxation
based defenses. Given that the inner maximization in problem (6) might be hard to solve due to the non-
convexity nature of deep neural networks, [KW18] and [RSL18a] considered a convex outer approximation of
the set of activations reachable through a norm-bounded perturbation for one-hidden-layer neural networks.
[WSMK18] later scaled the methods to larger models, and [RSL18b] proposed a tighter convex approximation.
[SND18, VNS+18] considered a Lagrangian penalty formulation of perturbing the underlying data distribution
in a Wasserstein ball. These approaches, however, do not apply when the activation function is ReLU.
Theoretical progress. Despite a large amount of empirical works on adversarial defenses, many fundamental
questions remain open in theory. There are a few preliminary explorations in recent years. [FFF18] derived
upper bounds on the robustness to perturbations of any classification function, under the assumption that the
data is generated with a smooth generative model. From computational aspects, [BPR18, BLPR18] showed that
adversarial examples in machine learning are likely not due to information-theoretic limitations, but rather it
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could be due to computational hardness. From statistical aspects, [SST+18] showed that the sample complexity
of robust training can be significantly larger than that of standard training. This gap holds irrespective of the
training algorithm or the model family. [CBM18] and [YRB18] studied the uniform convergence of robust
error Rrob(f) by extending the classic VC and Rademacher arguments to the case of adversarial learning,
respectively. A recent work demonstrates the existence of trade-off between accuracy and robustness [TSE+19],
without providing a practical algorithm to address it.
B Proofs of Main Results
In this section, we provide the proofs of our main results.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Theorem 3.1 (restated). LetRφ(f) := Eφ(f(X)Y ) andR∗φ := minf Rφ(f). Under Assumption 1, for any
non-negative loss function φ such that φ(0) ≥ 1, any measurable f : X → R, any probability distribution on
X × {±1}, and any λ > 0, we have
Rrob(f)−R∗nat ≤ ψ−1(Rφ(f)−R∗φ) + Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f), ), f(X)Y > 0]
≤ ψ−1(Rφ(f)−R∗φ) + E max
X′∈B(X,)
φ(f(X ′)f(X)/λ).
Proof. By Eqn. (1),Rrob(f)−R∗nat = Rnat(f)−R∗nat +Rbdy(f) ≤ ψ−1(Rφ(f)−R∗φ) +Rbdy(f), where
the last inequality holds because we choose φ as a classification-calibrated loss [BJM06]. This leads to the first
inequality.
Also, notice that
Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f), ), f(X)Y > 0] ≤ Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f), )]
= E max
X′∈B(X,)
1{f(X ′) 6= f(X)}
= E max
X′∈B(X,)
1{f(X ′)f(X)/λ < 0}
≤ E max
X′∈B(X,)
φ(f(X ′)f(X)/λ).
This leads to the second inequality.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Theorem 3.2 (restated). Suppose that |X | ≥ 2. Under Assumption 1, for any non-negative loss function φ
such that φ(x) → 0 as x → +∞, any ξ > 0, and any θ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a probability distribution on
X × {±1}, a function f : Rd → R, and a regularization parameter λ > 0 such thatRrob(f)−R∗nat = θ and
ψ
(
θ − E max
X′∈B(X,)
φ(f(X ′)f(X)/λ)
)
≤ Rφ(f)−R∗φ ≤ ψ
(
θ − E max
X′∈B(X,)
φ(f(X ′)f(X)/λ)
)
+ ξ.
20
Proof. The first inequality follows from Theorem 3.1. Thus it suffices to prove the second inequality.
Fix  > 0 and θ ∈ [0, 1]. By the definition of ψ and its continuity, we can choose γ, α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1]
such that θ = γα1 + (1 − γ)α2 and ψ(θ) ≥ γψ˜(α1) + (1 − γ)ψ˜(α2) − /3. For two distinct points
x1,x2 ∈ X , we set PX such that Pr[X = x1] = γ, Pr[X = x2] = 1 − γ, η(x1) = (1 + α1)/2, and
η(x2) = (1 + α2)/2. By the definition of H−, we choose function f : Rd → R such that f(x) < 0 for all
x ∈ X , Cη(x1)(f(x1)) ≤ H−(η(x1)) + /3, and Cη(x2)(f(x2)) ≤ H−(η(x2)) + /3. By the continuity of
ψ, there is an ′ > 0 such that ψ(θ) ≤ ψ(θ − 0) + /3 for all 0 ≤ 0 < ′. We also note that there exists an
λ0 > 0 such that for any 0 < λ < λ0, we have
0 ≤ E max
X′∈B(X,)
φ(f(X ′)f(X)/λ) < ′.
Thus, we have
Rφ(f)−R∗φ = Eφ(Y f(X))− inf
f
Eφ(Y f(X))
= γ[Cη(x1)(f(x1))−H(η(x1))] + (1− γ)[Cη(x2)(f(x2))−H(η(x2))]
≤ γ[H−(η(x1))−H(η(x1))] + (1− γ)[H−(η(x2))−H(η(x2))] + /3
= γψ˜(α1) + (1− γ)ψ˜(α2) + /3
≤ ψ(θ) + 2/3
≤ ψ
(
θ − E max
X′∈B(X,)
φ(f(X ′)f(X)/λ)
)
+ .
Furthermore, by Lemma C.6,
Rrob(f)−R∗nat = E[1{sign(f(X)) 6= sign(f∗(X)),X ∈ B(DB(f), )⊥}|2η(X)− 1|]
+ Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f), ), sign(f∗(X)) = Y ]
= E|2η(X)− 1|
= γ(2η(x1)− 1) + (1− γ)(2η(x2)− 1)
= θ,
where f∗ is the Bayes optimal classifier which outputs “positive” for all data points.
C Extra Theoretical Results
In this section, we provide extra theoretical results for adversarial defenses.
C.1 Adversarial vulnerability under log-concave distributions
Theorem 3.1 states that for any classifier f , the value Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f), )] characterizes the robustness of the
classifier. In this section, we show that among all classifiers such that Pr[sign(f(X)) = +1] = 1/2, linear
classifier minimizes
lim inf
→+0
Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f), )]

, (7)
provided that the marginal distribution over X is products of log-concave measures. A measure is log-concave if
the logarithm of its density is a concave function. The class of log-concave measures contains many well-known
(classes of) distributions as special cases, such as Gaussian and uniform measure over ball.
Our results are inspired by the isoperimetric inequality of log-concave distributions by the work of [Bar01].
Intuitively, the isoperimetric problem consists in finding subsets of prescribed measure, such that its measure
increases the less under enlargement. Our analysis leads to the following guarantee on the quantity (7).
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Figure 4: Left figure: boundary neighborhood of linear classifier. Right figure: boundary neighborhood of
non-linear classifier. Theorem C.1 shows that the mass of Slinear is smaller than the mass of Snon-linear, provided
that the underlying distribution over the instance space is the products of log-concave distribution on the real
line.
Theorem C.1. Let µ be an absolutely continuous log-concave probability measure on R with even density
function and let µ⊗d be the products of µ with dimension d. Denote by dµ = e−M(x), where M : R→ [0,∞]
is convex. Assume that M(0) = 0. If
√
M(x) is a convex function, then for every integer d and any classifier
f with Pr[sign(f(X)) = +1] = 1/2, we have
lim inf
→+0
PrX∼µ⊗d [X ∈ B(DB(f), )]

≥ c
for an absolute constant c > 0. Furthermore, among all such probability measures and classifiers, the linear
classifier over products of Gaussian measure with mean 0 and variance 1/(2pi) achieves the lower bound.
Theorem C.1 claims that under the products of log-concave distributions, the quantity Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f), )]
increases with rate at least Ω() for all classifier f , among which the linear classifier achieves the minimal
value.
C.1.1 Proofs of Theorem C.1
For a Borel set A and for  > 0, denote by A = {x : d(x,A) ≤ }. The boundary measure of A is then
defined as
µ+(A) = lim inf
→+0
µ(A)− µ(A)

.
The isoperimetric function is
Iµ = inf{µ+(A) : µ(A) = 1/2}. (8)
Before proceeding, we cite the following results from [Bar01].
Lemma C.2 (Theorem 9, [Bar01]). Let µ be an absolutely continuous log-concave probability measure on R
with even density function. Denote by dµ = e−M(x), where M : R→ [0,∞] is convex. Assume that M(0) = 0.
If
√
M(x) is a convex function, then for every integer d, we have Iµ⊗d ≥ Iγ⊗d , where γ is the Gaussian
measure with mean 0 and variance 1/(2pi). In particular, among sets of measure 1/2 for µ⊗d, the halfspace
[0,∞)× Rd−1 is solution to the isoperimetric problem (8).
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Now we are ready to prove Theorem C.1.
Proof. We note that
Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f), )]
= Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f), ), sign(f(X)) = +1] + Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f), ), sign(f(X)) = −1].
To apply Lemma C.2, we set the A in Lemma C.2 as the event {sign(f(X)) = +1}. Therefore, the set
A = {X ∈ B(DB(f), ), sign(f(X)) = −1}.
By Lemma C.2, we know that for linear classifier f0 which represents the halfspace [0,∞)× Rd−1, and any
classifier f ,
lim inf
→+0
PrX∼µ⊗d [X ∈ B(DB(f), ), sign(f(X)) = −1]− Pr[sign(f(X)) = +1]

≥ lim inf
→+0
PrX∼γ⊗d [X ∈ B(DB(f0), ), sign(f0(X)) = −1]− Pr[sign(f0(X)) = +1]

.
(9)
Similarly, we have
lim inf
→+0
PrX∼µ⊗d [X ∈ B(DB(f), ), sign(f(X)) = +1]− Pr[sign(f(X)) = −1]

≥ lim inf
→+0
PrX∼γ⊗d [X ∈ B(DB(f0), ), sign(f0(X)) = +1]− Pr[sign(f0(X)) = −1]

.
(10)
Adding both sides of Eqns. (9) and (10), we have
lim inf
→+0
PrX∼µ⊗d [X ∈ B(DB(f), )]

≥ lim inf
→+0
PrX∼γ⊗d [X ∈ B(DB(f0), )]

≥ c.
C.2 Margin based generalization bounds
Before proceeding, we first cite a useful lemma. We say that function f1 : R→ R and f2 : R→ R have a γ
separator if there exists a function f3 : R → R such that |h1 − h2| ≤ γ implies f1(h1) ≤ f3(h2) ≤ f2(h1).
For any given function f1 and γ > 0, one can always construct f2 and f3 such that f1 and f2 have a γ-separator
f3 by setting f2(h) = sup|h−h′|≤2γ f1(h′) and f3(h) = sup|h−h′|≤γ f1(h′).
Lemma C.3 (Corollary 1, [Zha02]). Let f1 be a function R→ R. Consider a family of functions fγ2 : R→ R,
parametrized by γ, such that 0 ≤ f1 ≤ fγ2 ≤ 1. Assume that for all γ, f1 and fγ2 has a γ separator. Assume
also that fγ2 (z) ≥ fγ
′
2 (z) when γ ≥ γ′. Let γ1 > γ2 > ... be a decreasing sequence of parameters, and pi be a
sequence of positive numbers such that
∑∞
i=1 pi = 1, then for all η > 0, with probability of at least 1− δ over
data:
E(X,Y )∼Df1(L(w,X, Y )) ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
fγ2 (L(w,xi, yi)) +
√
32
n
(
ln 4N∞(L, γi,x1:n) + ln 1
piδ
)
for all w and γ, where for each fixed γ, we use i to denote the smallest index such that γi ≤ γ.
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Lemma C.4 (Theorem 4, [Zha02]). If ‖x‖p ≤ b and ‖w‖q ≤ a, where 2 ≤ p <∞ and 1/p+ 1/q = 1, then
∀γ > 0,
log2N∞(L, γ, n) ≤ 36(p− 1)
a2b2
γ2
log2[2d4ab/γ + 2e+ 1].
Theorem C.5. Suppose that the data is 2-norm bounded by ‖x‖2 ≤ b. Consider the family Γ of linear classifier
w with ‖w‖2 = 1. Let Rrob(w) := E(X,Y )∼D1[∃Xrob ∈ B2(X, ) such that YwTXrob ≤ 0]. Then with
probability at least 1− δ over n random samples (xi, yi) ∼ D, for all margin width γ > 0 and w ∈ Γ, we have
Rrob(w) ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1(∃xrobi ∈ B(xi, ) s.t. yiwTxrobi ≤ 2γ) +
√
C
n
(
b2
γ2
lnn+ ln
1
δ
)
.
Proof. The theorem is a straightforward result of Lemmas C.3 and C.4 with
L(w,x, y) = min
xrob∈B(x,)
ywTxrob,
f1(g) = 1(g ≤ 0) and fγ2 (h) = sup|g−h|<2γ
f1(g) = f1(g − 2γ) = 1(g ≤ 2γ),
and γi = b/2i and pi = 1/2i.
We note that for the `2 ball B2(x, ) = {x′ : ‖x− x′‖2 ≤ }, we have
1(∃xrobi ∈ B(xi, ) s.t. yiwTxrobi ≤ 2γ) = max
xrobi ∈B(xi,)
1(yiw
Txrobi ≤ 2γ) = 1(yiwTxi ≤ 2γ + ).
Therefore, we can design the following algorithm—Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Adversarial Training of Linear Separator via Structural Risk Minimization
Input: Samples (x1:n, y1:n) ∼ D, a bunch of margin parameters γ1, ..., γT .
1: For k = 1, 2, ..., T
2: Solve the minimax optimization problem:
Lk(w∗k,x1:n, y1:n) = min
w∈S(0,1)
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
xrobi ∈B(xi,)
1(yiw
Txrobi ≤ 2γk)
= min
w∈S(0,1)
1
n
n∑
i=1
1(yiw
Txi ≤ 2γk + ).
3: End For
4: k∗ = argmink Lk(w∗k,x1:n, y1:n) +
√
C
n
(
b2
γ2k
lnn+ ln 1δ
)
.
Output: Hypothesis wk∗ .
C.3 A lemma
We denote by f∗(·) := 2η(·)− 1 the Bayes decision rule throughout the proofs.
Lemma C.6. For any classifier f , we have
Rrob(f)−R∗nat =E[1{sign(f(X)) 6= sign(f∗(X)),X ∈ B(DB(f), )⊥}|2η(X)− 1|]
+ Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f), ), sign(f∗(X)) = Y ].
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Proof. For any classifier f , we have
Pr(∃X ′ ∈ B(X, ) s.t. sign(f(X ′)) 6= Y |X = x)
= Pr(Y = 1, ∃X ′ ∈ B(X, ) s.t. sign(f(X ′)) = −1|X = x)
+ Pr(Y = −1, ∃X ′ ∈ B(X, ) s.t. sign(f(X ′)) = 1|X = x)
= E[1{Y = 1}1{∃X ′ ∈ B(X, ) s.t. sign(f(X ′)) = −1}|X = x]
+ E[1{Y = −1}1{∃X ′ ∈ B(X, ) s.t. sign(f(X ′)) = 1}|X = x]
= 1{∃x′ ∈ B(x, ) s.t. sign(f(x′)) = −1}E1{Y = 1|X = x}
+ 1{∃x′ ∈ B(x, ) s.t. sign(f(x′)) = 1}E1{Y = −1|X = x}
= 1{∃x′ ∈ B(x, ) s.t. sign(f(x′)) = −1}η(x) + 1{∃x′ ∈ B(x, ) s.t. sign(f(x′)) = 1}(1− η(x))
=
{
1, x ∈ B(DB(f), ),
1{sign(f(x)) = −1}(2η(x)− 1) + (1− η(x)), otherwise.
Therefore,
Rrob(f)
=
∫
X
Pr[∃X ′ ∈ B(X, ) s.t. sign(f(X ′)) 6= Y |X = x]dPrX(x)
=
∫
B(DB(f),)
Pr[∃X ′ ∈ B(X, ) s.t. sign(f(X ′)) 6= Y |X = x]dPrX(x)
+
∫
B(DB(f),)⊥
Pr[∃X ′ ∈ B(X, ) s.t. sign(f(X ′)) 6= Y |X = x]dPrX(x)
= Pr(X ∈ B(DB(f), ))
+
∫
B(DB(f),)⊥
[1{sign(f(x)) = −1}(2η(x)− 1) + (1− η(x))]dPrX(x).
We have
Rrob(f)−Rnat(f∗)
= Pr(X ∈ B(DB(f), )) +
∫
B(DB(f),)⊥
[1{sign(f(x)) = −1}(2η(x)− 1) + (1− η(x))]dPrX(x)
−
∫
B(DB(f),)⊥
[1{sign(f∗(x)) = −1}(2η(x)− 1) + (1− η(x))]dPrX(x)
−
∫
B(DB(f),)
[1{sign(f∗(x)) = −1}(2η(x)− 1) + (1− η(x))]dPrX(x)
= Pr(X ∈ B(DB(f), ))−
∫
B(DB(f),)
[1{sign(f∗(x)) = −1}(2η(x)− 1) + (1− η(x))]dPrX(x)
+ E[1{sign(f(X)) 6= sign(η(X)− 1/2),X ∈ B(DB(f), )⊥}|2η(X)− 1|]
= Pr(X ∈ B(DB(f), ))− E[1{X ∈ B(DB(f), )}min{η(X), 1− η(X)}]
+ E[1{sign(f(X)) 6= sign(η(X)− 1/2),X ∈ B(DB(f), )⊥}|2η(X)− 1|]
= E[1{X ∈ B(DB(f), )}max{η(X), 1− η(X)}]
+ E[1{sign(f(X)) 6= sign(η(X)− 1/2),X ∈ B(DB(f), )⊥}|2η(X)− 1|]
= Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f), ), sign(f∗(X)) = Y ]
+ E[1{sign(f(X)) 6= sign(f∗(X)),X ∈ B(DB(f), )⊥}|2η(X)− 1|].
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D Extra Experimental Results
In this section, we provide extra experimental results to verify the effectiveness of our proposed method
TRADES.
D.1 Experimental setup in Section 5.3.1
We use the same model, i.e., the WRN-34-10 architecture in [ZK16], to implement the methods in [ZSLG16],
[KGB17] and [RDV17]. The experimental setup is the same as TRADES, which is specified in the beginning
of Section 5. For example, we use the same batch size and learning rate for all the methods. More specifically,
we find that using one-step adversarial perturbation method like FGSM in the regularization term, defined in
[KGB17], cannot defend against FGSMk (white-box) attack. Therefore, we use FGSMk with the cross-entropy
loss to calculate the adversarial example X ′ in the regularization term, and the perturbation step size η1 and
number of iterations K are the same as in the beginning of Section 5.
As for defense models in Table 5, we implement the ‘TRADES’ models, the models trained by using other
regularization losses in [KGB17, RDV17, ZSLG16], and the defense model ‘Madry’ in the antepenultimate
line of Table 5. We evaluate [WSMK18]’s model based on the checkpoint provided by the authors. The rest of
the models in Table 5 are reported in [ACW18].
D.2 Extra attack results in Section 5.3.1
Extra white-box attack results are provided in Table 8.
Table 8: Results of our method TRADES under different white-box attacks.
Defense Under which attack Dataset Distance Anat(f) Arob(f)
TRADES (1/λ = 1.0) FGSM CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 88.64% 56.38%
TRADES (1/λ = 1.0) DeepFool (`2) CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 88.64% 84.49%
TRADES (1/λ = 6.0) FGSM CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 84.92% 61.06%
TRADES (1/λ = 6.0) DeepFool (`2) CIFAR10 0.031 (`∞) 84.92% 81.55%
The attacks in Table 5 and Table 8 include FGSMk [KGB17], DeepFool (`∞) [MDFF16], LBFGSAt-
tack [TV16], MI-FGSM [DLP+18], C&W [CW17], FGSM [KGB17], and DeepFool (`2) [MDFF16].
D.3 Extra attack results in Section 5.3.2
Extra black-box attack results are provided in Table 9 and Table 10. We apply black-box FGSM attack on the
MNIST dataset and the CIFAR10 dataset.
Table 9: Comparisons of TRADES with prior defense models under black-box FGSM attack on the MNIST
dataset. The models inside parentheses are source models which provide gradients to adversarial attackers.
Defense Model Robust Accuracy Arob(f)
Madry 97.68% (Natural) 98.11% (Ours)
TRADES 97.75% (Natural) 98.44% (Madry)
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Table 10: Comparisons of TRADES with prior defense models under black-box FGSM attack on the CIFAR10
dataset. The models inside parentheses are source models which provide gradients to adversarial attackers.
Defense Model Robust Accuracy Arob(f)
Madry 84.02% (Natural) 67.66% (Ours)
TRADES 86.84% (Natural) 71.52% (Madry)
D.4 Experimental setup in Section 5.3.2
The robust accuracy of [MMS+18]’s CNN model is 96.01% on the MNIST dataset. The robust accuracy
of [MMS+18]’s WRN-34-10 model is 47.66% on the CIFAR10 dataset. Note that we use the same white-box
attack method introduced in the Section 5.3.1, i.e., FGSM20, to evaluate the robust accuracies of Madry’s
models.
D.5 Interpretability of the robust models trained by TRADES
D.5.1 Adversarial examples on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets
In this section, we provide adversarial examples on MNIST and CIFAR10. We apply foolbox3 [RBB17] to
generate adversarial examples, which is able to return the smallest adversarial perturbations under the `∞ norm
distance. The adversarial examples are generated by using FGSMk (white-box) attack on the models described
in Section 5, including Natural models, Madry’s models and TRADES models. Note that the FGSMk attack is
foolbox.attacks.LinfinityBasicIterativeAttack in foolbox. See Figure 5 and Figure 6
for the adversarial examples of different models on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets.
D.5.2 Adversarial examples on Bird-or-Bicycle dataset
We find that the robust models trained by TRADES have strong interpretability. To see this, we apply a
(spatial-tranformation-invariant) version of TRADES to train ResNet-50 models in response to the unrestricted
adversarial examples of the bird-or-bicycle dataset [BCZ+18]. The dataset is bird-or-bicycle, which consists of
30,000 pixel-224 × 224 images with label either ‘bird’ or ‘bicycle’. The unrestricted threat models include
structural perturbations, rotations, translations, resizing, 17+ common corruptions, etc.
We show in Figures 7 and 8 the adversarial examples by the boundary attack with random spatial transforma-
tion on our robust model trained by the variant of TRADES. The boundary attack [BRB18] is a black-box attack
method which searches for data points near the decision boundary and attack robust models by these data points.
Therefore, the adversarial images obtained by boundary attack characterize the images around the decision
boundary of robust models. We attack our model by boundary attack with random spatial transformations, a
baseline in the competition. The classification accuracy on the adversarial test data is as high as 95% (at 80%
coverage), even though the adversarial corruptions are perceptible to human. We observe that the robust model
trained by TRADES has strong interpretability: in Figure 7 all of adversarial images have obvious feature of
‘bird’, while in Figure 8 all of adversarial images have obvious feature of ‘bicycle’. This shows that images
around the decision boundary of truly robust model have features of both classes.
3Link: https://foolbox.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html
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(a) adversarial examples of class ‘3’
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(b) adversarial examples of class ‘4’
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(c) adversarial examples of class ‘5’
-norm=0.3694
Perturbed Image
Perturbation
label: 2 label: 2 label: 2
Original Image
ℓ∞
label: 7
-norm=0.3226ℓ∞ -norm=0.0971ℓ∞
TRADES Madry Natural
(d) adversarial examples of class ‘7’
Figure 5: Adversarial examples on MNIST dataset. In each subfigure, the image in the first row is the original
image and we list the corresponding correct label beneath the image. We show the perturbed images in the
second row. The differences between the perturbed images and the original images, i.e., the perturbations, are
shown in the third row. In each column, the perturbed image and the perturbation are generated by FGSMk
(white-box) attack on the model listed below. The labels beneath the perturbed images are the predictions of
the corresponding models, which are different from the correct labels. We record the smallest perturbations in
terms of `∞ norm that make the models predict a wrong label.
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(a) adversarial examples of class ‘automobile’
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(b) adversarial examples of class ‘deer’
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(c) adversarial examples of class ‘ship’
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TRADES Madry Natural
(d) adversarial examples of class ‘truck’
Figure 6: Adversarial examples on CIFAR10 dataset. In each subfigure, the image in the first row is the original
image and we list the corresponding correct label beneath the image. We show the perturbed images in the
second row. The differences between the perturbed images and the original images, i.e., the perturbations, are
shown in the third row. In each column, the perturbed image and the perturbation are generated by FGSMk
(white-box) attack on the model listed below. The labels beneath the perturbed images are the predictions of
the corresponding models, which are different from the correct labels. We record the smallest perturbations in
terms of `∞ norm that make the models predict a wrong label (best viewed in color).
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(a) clean example (b) adversarial example by boundary at-
tack with random spatial transformation
(c) clean example (d) adversarial example by boundary at-
tack with random spatial transformation
(e) clean example (f) adversarial example by boundary at-
tack with random spatial transformation
Figure 7: Adversarial examples by boundary attack with random spatial transformation on the ResNet-50
model trained by a variant of TRADES. The ground-truth label is ‘bicycle’, and our robust model recognizes
the adversarial examples correctly as ‘bicycle’. It shows in the second column that all of adversarial images
have obvious feature of ‘bird’ (best viewed in color).
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(a) clean example (b) adversarial example by boundary at-
tack with random spatial transformation
(c) clean example (d) adversarial example by boundary at-
tack with random spatial transformation
(e) clean example (f) adversarial example by boundary at-
tack with random spatial transformation
Figure 8: Adversarial examples by boundary attack with random spatial transformation on the ResNet-50
model trained by a variant of TRADES. The ground-truth label is ‘bird’, and our robust model recognizes the
adversarial examples correctly as ‘bird’. It shows in the second column that all of adversarial images have
obvious feature of ‘bicycle’ (best viewed in color).
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